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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Italian legal system is undergoing a development process 
involving the traditional pillars of its legal framework. In addition 
to the law of contracts, usually accustomed to dealing with new 
legal tools autonomously developed by the contracting parties and 
generally circulating from other legal systems, other significant 
areas of law have been remarkably interested: for example, family 
law, succession law, bankruptcy law, and the law of obligations, in 
particular rules providing for debtor’s liability and creditor’s 
rights.1 This phenomenon has prompted a re-evaluation of the 
approach to fundamental concepts as well as the limits traditionally 
 ∗  Assistant Professor, University of Bologna School of Law; LL.M., 
Louisiana State University; Three-year doctorate in comparative law, University 
of Milan. 
 1. See, for example, Directive 2002/47/EC on financial collateral 
arrangements, entitling the collateral-taker, should an enforcement event occur, 
to realize the collateral by appropriation (Directive, art. 4, 2002 O.J. (L168) 43. 
The text of the directive is also available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/). The 
Directive has been implemented in Italy through the Legislative Decree 
170/2004: this provision, and in particular art. 4 of the same, introduced a 
remarkable exception to art. 2744 of the Italian Civil Code which prohibits any 
form of the collateral’s appropriation by the creditor. 
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perceived as absolute (for example, the rule on the universal 
liability of the debtor set forth in article 2740 of the Italian Civil 
Code, that nowadays suffers so many exceptions that its 
prescriptive value of intangible provision has been weakened).2 
The change seems mainly due—directly or indirectly—to the 
entrance of the “trust” on the Italian scene: this occurrence induced 
several reactions, in particular by Italian lawmakers, who aimed at 
offering new and workable alternatives to trust. Although the 
debate within the Italian arena did not exclusively focus on this 
legal instrument and was enriched by suggestions coming from 
different sources (for example, Italian society, as well as European 
Institutions), nevertheless the increasing recourse to trust 
undoubtedly played a major role in the process of the 
reconsideration of traditional legal categories and the drafting new 
legal tools.3 In this sense, it can be said that the Italian legal 
menu,4 which used to offer potential customers a list of traditional 
 2. See, for example, Tribunal of Reggio Emilia, ord. of 14 May 2007, 
according to which such prescription would be deprived of its function, in Guida 
al diritto, 2007, n. 26, 50, commented by G. Finocchiaro. 
 3. The comparative literature grants specific attention to phenomena of 
circulation of models, legal transplants, legal irritants, legal flows and other 
events inducing reactions and change in the recipient country. Among the many 
contributions, see, for example, ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN 
APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (Univ. Press of Virginia 1974) (the work has 
then been followed by other essays by the same author, developing the theory 
introduced therein); RODOLFO SACCO, INTRODUZIONE AL DIRITTO COMPARATO 
(5th ed., Utet 1992) (focusing attention on the circulation of models and 
highlighting two determining factors: force and prestige); Gunther Teubner, 
Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in 
New Differences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998) (arguing that legal irritants explain 
the transfer of legal rules from one country to another better than legal 
transplants: while a transplant would induce either rejection or acceptance of the 
alien organ, to the contrary, when a foreign rule is imposed on a domestic 
culture, it is not transplanted into another organism, but rather works as a 
fundamental irritation which triggers a whole series of new and unexpected 
events); MAURIZIO LUPOI, SISTEMI GIURIDICI COMPARATI. TRACCIA DI UN 
CORSO 60 (ESI 2001) (defining as legal flow any element of a legal system 
operating in another system and introducing a situation of imbalance in the 
latter). See also, recently, Michele Graziadei, Legal Transplants and the 
Frontiers of Legal Knowledge, 10 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 723 (2009). 
 4. The title of the present work evokes the essay of Ian Ayres, Menus 
Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (2006) (holding that lawmakers can affect 
contractual equilibria by regulating contractual menus, assuming that a menu is 
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dishes, has been enriched in order to take into account the 
preferences of parties with heterogeneous tastes.5 
II. TRUST AND THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 
Italy was the first country to ratify the Hague Convention on 
the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition,6 through 
Law no. 364, of 16 October 1989, which came into force on 
January 1, 1992 (“Convention”).7 
Although there had been precedents dealing with trusts, the 
most significant case law—and the related attempts by the 
legislative formant8 to create competitive alternatives—occurred 
after the implementation in Italy of the Convention.9  
a contractual offer that empowers the offeree to accept more than one type of 
contract, and highlighting that the menu can consist of two simultaneous offers 
that private parties make to each other and/or of offers that the state makes to 
potential contractors themselves) in order to highlight how the Italian legal 
sphere has been enriched with new legal instruments developed by private 
parties and/or introduced by Italian lawmakers.  
 5. The offer has therefore been amended, revisiting traditional recipes 
and/or adding new dishes to traditional ones like in the case of a menu listing at 
the same time homemade cannelloni, cardamom-flavoured ragù and shrimp-
tempura. On food and recipes as a metaphor of legal systems, see in particular 
Olivier Moréteau, Mare Nostrum as the Cauldron of Western Legal Traditions: 
Stirring the Broth, Making Sense of Legal Gumbo Whilst Understanding 
Contamination, 4 J. CIV. L. STUD. 515 (2011). 
 6. The Hague, Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their 
Recognition, July 1, 1985 [hereinafter Hague Trust Convention], available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=59 (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2014). 
 7. See generally Antonio Gambaro, Trust in DIGESTO DISCIPLINE 
PRIVATISTICHE, SEZ. CIVILE, TURIN, XIX at 449 et seq. (1999). 
 8. See in particular Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach 
to Comparative Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1991) and Sacco, Legal Formants: 
A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law II, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 343. 
 9. It has been noted that a significant contribution to the Italian reflection 
over trusts was given by the enactment of the Law of the Republic of San 
Marino of 17 March 2005, no. 37, on trust. Though the legal system of San 
Marino and Italy are different (for example, because a main source of law in San 
Marino is ius commune), the above-mentioned legislative provision is the first of 
a civil law country drafted in Italian and providing for trust. See generally 
Enrica Senini, La nuova Legislazione della Repubblica di San Marino sul Trust, 
7:3 TRUSTS 368 (2006). 
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Court rulings on trusts before such event generally either: (i) 
denied recognition of the latter on the basis of the assumed 
irreconcilable conflict between trusts and mandatory rules of the 
Italian legal system (for example, the concept of double-ownership 
allegedly related to trust against the uniqueness of the ownership 
right as set forth in art. 832 of the Italian Civil Code (hereinafter 
“C.C.”); the numerus clausus of the iura in re aliena, and the 
limits imposed by article 2740 C.C. about debtor’s liability (which, 
in paragraph 2, prevents any form of asset-segregation unless 
expressly admitted by law); or (ii) recognized only limited effects 
to trusts as long as they may be lead back, by analogy, to similar 
provisions of the Italian law.10  
On the contrary, countries which ratified the Convention are 
obliged to recognize the legal effects of trusts subject to the law of 
a trust-country.  
However, it has to be noted that the definition of trust under the 
Convention does not match that pertaining to the English common 
law.11 Pursuant to article 2, paragraph 1 of the former, trust 
includes “the legal relationship created, inter vivos or on death, by 
a person, the settlor, when assets have been placed under the 
control of a trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary or for a 
specified purpose.”12  
Rather than properly defining trust, the Convention therefore 
opts in favor of a functional approach by depicting the 
characteristics of phenomena not necessarily falling under the 
concept of “trust” as developed in the English legal system. In 
addition, while English law recognizes both constructive and 
resulting trusts, the Convention applies only to voluntary trusts. 
 10. See, for example, Tribunal of Oristano, 15 Maggio 1956, FORO 
ITALIANO, 1956, I, 1019; Tribunal of Casale Monferrato, decr. 13 Aprile 1984, II 
RIV. NOT., 243 (1985). 
 11. With reference to trust within the common law system, see generally 
GERAINT THOMAS & ALASTAIR HUDSON, THE LAW OF TRUSTS (Oxford Univ. 
Press 2004); Geoffrey C. CHESHIRE, IL CONCETTO DEL TRUST SECONDO LA 
COMMON LAW INGLESE (Diego Corapi intro., G. Giappichelli 1998). 
 12. Hague Trust Convention, supra note 6. 
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Second, the relationship between the trust fund and the trustee is 
described by the Convention in terms of “control”, with no further 
legal qualification. However, article 2, paragraph 2 of the same 
provides a guideline requiring a trust for the purposes of the 
Convention to have the following characteristics:  
(a) the assets constitute a separate fund and are not a part of the 
trustee’s own estate; 
(b) title to the trust assets stands in the name of the trustee or in 
the name of another person on behalf of the trustee; 
(c) the trustee has the power and the duty, in respect of which 
he is accountable, to manage, employ or dispose of the assets in 
accordance with the terms of the trust and the special duties 
imposed upon him by law.13 
Consequently, legal relationships meeting the requirements set 
forth by the Convention will be recognized in Italy as “trusts”, 
although under English law they would fall within different legal 
categories. For this reason Professor Maurizio Lupoi refers to trust 
pursuant to the Convention in terms of “shapeless trust”.14  
During the last twenty years, following the implementation of 
the Convention, Italian courts faced an increasing number of cases 
involving recognition of trusts, thus developing substantial body of 
case law.15  
For example, in 1997 the Tribunal of Lucca ruled about a 
succession dispute grounded on the alleged nullity of a will 
providing for the appointment of a fiduciary executor who should 
 13. Hague Trust Convention, supra note 6. 
 14. MAURIZIO LUPOI, TRUSTS 425 et seq. (Giuffrè 1997); LUPOI, TRUSTS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY (Simon Dix trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000). 
 15. For a survey of Italian case-law on trusts, see in particular: La 
Giurisprudenza Italiana sui Trust in TRUSTS: OPINIONI A CONFRONTO 207-96 (E. 
Barla De Guglielmi ed., IPSOA 2006) (reporting several contributions of judges 
and law professors highlighting that: (i) trusts and, in particular, “domestic 
trusts” have become part of the Italian legal framework; (ii) trusts are broadly 
applied within the field of corporate law, real estate law, bankruptcy law and 
family law; (iii) Italian judges tend to disregard trusts when there is a clear 
evidence of the abusive recourse to the trust-scheme, while, in opposite cases, 
tend to grant full recognition to such scheme and its effects). 
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have managed the hereditary asset on behalf of the daughter of the 
de cuius. The daughter claimed the will should be declared null. To 
the contrary, the Tribunal affirmed the full legitimacy and validity 
of the latter, arguing that the legal relationship depicted therein 
amounted to a trust, thus qualifying the fiduciary executor as 
trustee and the daughter of the de cuius as beneficiary;16 in 
addition, the judge held that the trust-scheme ought to be 
recognized and applied even within successions governed by 
Italian law. Then, in two decisions in 2000 involving the purchase 
of immovables, both the Tribunal of Bologna and Tribunal of 
Chieti ruled in favor of registration of the purchase carried out by 
the trustee in his specific capacity.17 A different approach has been 
taken by the Tribunal of Velletri,18 according to which the so-
called “domestic trust” (namely, a trust in which the sole foreign 
element is the governing law), although not falling within the 
provisions of the Convention and therefore not recognizable under 
the latter, nevertheless is enforceable in Italy pursuant to article 
1322 C.C. Such a provision grants parties the right to create 
atypical contracts provided that they are aimed at satisfying 
interests worthy of legal protection. With reference to such an 
approach, it has to be highlighted that sometimes a tendency to 
assimilate trust to contracts may be inferred, although, as is known, 
the law of trusts and the law of contracts are different.19 
The Tribunal of Milan has, for example, approved a voluntary 
separation agreement providing for the creation of a trust aimed to 
protect the interests of the minor child of the parties;20 the Tribunal 
of Parma has approved a pre-bankruptcy agreement submitted by a 
 16. Tribunal of Lucca, judgment of 23 September 1997, FORO ITALIANO 
2007 (1998). 
 17. Tribunal of Bologna, decr. of 18 April 2000, TRUSTS 372 (2000); Trib. 
of Chieti, ord. of 10 March 2000, id.  
 18. Tribunal of Velletri, ord. of 7 March 2005, TRUSTS 407 (2005). 
 19. See Michele Graziadei, Trusts in Italian law: a matter of property or of 
obligation?, in Italian national Reports to the XVth International Congress of 
comparative law 189 (Milan, 1998). 
 20. Tribunal of Milan, decr. of 23 February 2005, RIV. NOT. 851 (2005); 
Tribunal of Parma, judgment of 3 March 2005, id. 
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limited company, providing for the immovable assets owned by the 
company’s director to be included in a trust fund, together with the 
appointment of the judicial executor of the agreement as trustee.21 
In spite of such an increase in judicial recognition of trusts, 
perplexities arose, especially among scholars. In particular, whilst 
a significant part of the Italian doctrine argues in favour of trusts, 
deeming that they have become part of the Italian scenario, other 
authors show a more critical approach, highlighting the unsolved 
conflicts between trusts and the Italian legal system. The issue 
nowadays seems overtaken by recent and significant 
 21. The Italian case law on trusts is quite substantial (LF: in the sense of 
large quantity); for a comprehensive collection see LA GIURISPRUDENZA 
ITALIANA SUI TRUSTS (4th ed., IPSOA 2011) (collecting judgments on trusts up 
to 2011). Among the recent decisions of the Italian Supreme Court, see, for 
example, Cass. civ. Sez. VI - 1, Ord. of 18 July 2013, n. 17621 (ruling about a 
conflict of competence between two Tribunals originated by the plaintiff’s 
request to be entitled to allot some assets within a trust fund on behalf of her 
minor children); Cass. civ. Sez. I, judg. of 26 July 2013, n. 18138 and Cass. civ. 
Sez. I, judg. of 11 July 2013, n. 17208 and Cass. civ. Sez. I, judg. of 30 May 
2013, n. 13659 (not specifically addressing trust issues, but assuming the 
existence of a trust for a company’s liquidation purposes); Cass. civ. Labor 
Section, judg. of 3 December 2012, n. 21607 (not specifically addressing trust 
issues, but assuming the existence of a trust created by the employer); Cass. civ. 
Plenary Session, Ord. of 15 March 2012, n. 4132 (affirming Italian jurisdiction 
in a succession dispute involving three trusts created by the de cuius during his 
life); Cass. civ. Sez. II, judg. of 22 December 2011, n. 28363 (pointing out the 
specific featuring elements of trusts in order to reject the claimant’s recourse). 
For a judgment specifically addressing the issue at hand, see Cass. civ. Sez. I, 
judg. of 13 June 2008, n. 16022. The controversy at issue involved the case of 
former husband and wife (both Italian citizens, but residing in England) who 
entered into a divorce agreement setting forth a trust. The trust fund involved an 
apartment to be managed on behalf of their minor children and both former 
spouses were appointed as joint-trustees. The agreement granted the gratuitous 
right of habitation to the mother and expressly provided for the duty to rent the 
apartment should the mother move elsewhere. When the mother had to move to 
Italy with the children for professional reasons, the apartment was not rented 
and nobody took care of it. The former husband then brought a civil suit in the 
Tribunal of Milan petitioning for the judicial substitution of the ex-wife and the 
appointment of a new trustee. The Italian judge deemed the trust subject to 
English law in compliance with art. 7 of the Convention, and substituted both 
the plaintiff and the defendant, alleging breach of the trustee’s duties by both, 
and appointed two new joint-trustees. The Milan Court of Appeal affirmed the 
decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, too, disregarding the pleas of both 
parties and agreeing with the reasoning of the lower court.  
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developments; however, it is a notable aspect of the Italian 
experience with particular reference to the doctrinal formant. 
The debate mainly focused on the “domestic trust”; namely, a 
trust in which the sole foreign element is the governing law, while 
all the other elements call for the application of the Italian law.22  
Pursuant to a minority doctrine, internal trusts are 
irreconcilable both with the provisions of the Convention (in 
particular, with art. 13) and those of the Italian system, specifically 
with the above-mentioned article 2740, paragraph 2 C.C., requiring 
exceptions to the rule on debtor’s liability to be introduced only 
through an express legislative provision, whilst the Convention 
does not have such an effect.23 Namely, since the Convention 
provides for conflict of law rules, it is prevented from introducing 
uniform rules of substantial law and therefore cannot have the 
effect to allow recognition or creation of new categories of trusts, 
such as the “domestic” one.24 To further support the negative 
approach to domestic trust, reference has traditionally been made 
 22. Literature on recognition of trusts in Italy, and in particular of the 
domestic trust, is really copious. With reference to this issue, see specifically 
Maurizio Lupoi, I trust nel diritto civile in TRATTATO DI DIRITTO CIVILE 263 et 
seq. (Rodolfo Sacco dir., Utet 2004) (summing up arguments on behalf and 
against the recognition of domestic trusts and concluding in favor of its positive 
recognition under the Convention). See also infra, note 25.  
 23. See, for example, Gerardo Broggini, Il trust nel diritto internazionale 
privato italiano in I TRUSTS IN ITALIA OGGI 11 (Ilaria Beneventi ed., Giuffrè 
1996); Gerardo Broggini, Trust e fiducia nel diritto internazionale privato, 
EUROPA E DIRITTO PRIVATO 410 (1998); Francesco Gazzoni, Tentativo 
dell’impossibile (osservazioni di un giurista non vivente su trust e trascrizione), 
RIV. NOT. 11 (2001); Francesco Gazzoni, In Italia tutto è permesso, anche quel 
che è vietato (lettera aperta a Maurizio Lupoi sul trust e su altre bagattelle), 
RIV. NOT. 1247 (2001); Carlo Castronovo, Trust e diritto civile italiano, VITA 
NOT. 1323 (1998); Luca Ragazzini, Trust interno e ordinamento giuridico 
italiano, RIV. NOT. 279 (1999); Vincenzo Mariconda, Contrastanti decisioni sul 
trust interno: nuovi interventi a favore, ma sono nettamente prevalenti gli 
argomenti contro l’ammissibilità, CORRIERE GIUR. 76 et seq. (2004); ARNALDO 
MORACE PINELLI, ATTI DI DESTINAZIONE, TRUST E RESPONSABILITÀ DEL 
DEBITORE 121 et seq. (Giuffrè 2007).  
 24. See, for example, Salvatore Mazzamuto, Il trust nell’ordinamento 
italiano dopo la Convenzione dell’Aja, VITA NOT. 754 (1998) (stating that 
recognition of internal trust would not be allowed under the Convention because 
its conflict of law rules provide for recognition of foreign trusts). 
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to the numerus clausus of iura in re aliena and the uniqueness of 
the right of ownership. 
According to the prevalent doctrine, domestic trusts shall be 
recognized in Italy, as well as any other trust under the 
Convention, namely because: (i) article 6 of the Convention grants 
the settlor freedom to choose the governing law of trust (although 
within the limit set forth by article 2 of the same); (ii) the 
Convention does not require the trust to include foreign elements 
in addition to the governing law;25 and, (iii) article 13 of the 
same26 must be interpreted as allowing judges to assess quam in 
concreto, on a case-by-case basis, the real purposes of the specific 
trust at stake. Article 13 would therefore leave judges a sort of 
residual power of control for those cases in which the recourse to 
trust appears merely instrumental.27 Consequently, internal trust 
 25. Pursuant to art. 11 of the Convention, a trust created in compliance with 
the law chosen by the settlor will have to be recognized as well as any other trust 
under the same Convention. In addition, art. 11 draws a distinction between 
necessary and further effects of the recognition of the shapeless trust. The 
necessary effects amount to segregation and the entitlement of the trustee to act 
on behalf of the trust and appear in this capacity before a court and/or any other 
public authority; further effects occur in so far as the governing law of the trust 
requires or provides for them. In particular: 
a) that personal creditors of the trustee shall have no recourse against 
the trust assets; b) that the trust assets shall not form part of the 
trustee’s estate upon his insolvency or bankruptcy; c) that the trust 
assets shall not form part of the matrimonial property of the trustee or 
his spouse nor part of the trustee’s estate upon his death; d) that the 
trust assets may be recovered when the trustee, in breach of trust, has 
mingled trust assets with his own property or has alienated trust assets 
(Hague Trust Convention, supra note 6, at art. 11, para. 2). 
 26. Hague Trust Convention, supra note 6, at art. 13: 
No State shall be bound to recognise a trust the significant elements of 
which, except for the choice of the applicable law, the place of 
administration and the habitual residence of the trustee, are more 
closely connected with States which do not have the institution of the 
trust or the category of trust involved. 
 27. Favorable to the recognition of domestic trust, for example, is Umberto 
Morello, Fiducia e trust: due esperienze a confronto in FIDUCIA, TRUST, 
MANDATO ED AGENCY 97 et seq. (Giuffré 1991); Alessia Busato, La figura del 
trust negli ordinamenti di common law e di diritto continentale, II RIV. DIR. CIV. 
341 (1992); Paulo Piccoli, Possibilità operative del trust nell’ordinamento 
italiano. L’operatività del trustee dopo la Convenzione dell’Aja, RIV. NOT. 66 
(1995); Nicolò Lipari, Fiducia statica e trusts in I TRUSTS IN ITALIA OGGI 75 
(Ilaria Beneventi ed., Giuffrè 1996); Maurizio Lupoi, Lettera a un notaio 
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shall be deemed in compliance with both the Convention and the 
relevant national provisions, and therefore deserve to be fully 
recognized within the Italian legal system. 
Italian Courts adopted heterogeneous approaches: besides 
judgments denying recognition of internal trust, there are several 
decisions allowing it.28 However, the judicial denial of trusts does 
curioso di trusts, RIV. NOT. 348 (1996); Paulo Piccoli & Nicola Raiti, Atto di 
costituzione di trust, RIV. NOT. 236 (1996); Raffaele Lener & Giovanni B. 
Bisogni, Omologa di prestito obbligazionario, LE SOCIETÀ 586 (1997); Micol-
Eloise D’Orio, Un trust a garanzia di un prestito obbligazionario. Percorsi e 
tendenze nella dottrina sui trusts, in II GIUR. COMM. 239 (1998); Pasquale Amati 
& Paulo Piccoli, Trascritto un immobile in trust, NOT. 593 (1999); ALESSANDRO 
DE DONATO, VALENTINA DE DONATO & MAURIZIO D’ERRICO, TRUST 
CONVENZIONALE. LINEAMENTI DI TEORIA E PRATICA 80 et seq. (Stamperia 
Nazionale 1999); Francesco Di Ciommo, Per una teoria negoziale del trust 
(ovvero perché non possiamo farne a meno), CORRIERE GIUR. 786 (1999); Paulo 
Piccoli, Il trust: questo (sempre meno) sconosciuto, CORRIERE GIUR. 391 (1996); 
Alexandra Braun, Trusts interni, RIV. DIR. CIV., 577 et seq. (2000); Stefano di 
Buttà, Effetti diretti della Convenzione dell’Aja nell’ordinamento italiano, 
TRUSTS E ATTIVITÀ FIDUCIARIE 557 (2000); NICOLA CANESSA, I TRUSTS 
INTERNI. AMMISSIBILITA DEL TRUST E APPLICAZIONI PRATICHE 
NELL’ORDINAMENTO ITALIANO 3 et seq., 17 et seq. (Il Sole 24 Ore 2001); Sergio 
M. Carbone, Autonomia privata, scelta della legge regolatrice del trust e 
riconoscimento dei suoi effetti nella Convenzione dell’Aja del 1985, TRUSTS E 
ATTIVITA FIDUCIARIE 145 (2000); Augusto Chizzini, Revoca del trustee e 
legittimazione all’azione possessoria, TRUSTS E ATTIVITA FIDUCIARIE 47 (2000); 
Giovanni Iudica, Trust e stock option, TRUSTS E ATTIVITA FIDUCIARIE 511 
(2000); Riccardo Luzzatto, Legge applicabile e riconoscimento di trusts secondo 
la Convenzione dell’Aja, TRUST 14 (2000); Luigi F. Risso, Il libro degli eventi 
del trust, TRUST 127 (2000); Lorenzo Salvatore, Il trend favorevole 
all’operatività del trust in Italia: esame ragionato di alcuni trusts compatibili in 
un’ottica notarile, CONTRATTO E IMPRESA 644 (2000); SAVERIO BARTOLI, IL 
TRUST, 597 ( Giuffrè 2001); Maurizio Lupoi, Lettera ad un notaio conoscitore 
dei trust, RIV. NOT. 1159 (2001); LUPOI, TRUSTS (2d ed., Giuffrè 2001); Luigi F. 
Risso, Dibattito sulla legge regolatrice del trust e ruolo del notaro, TRUSTS E 
ATTIVITA FIDUCIARIE 333 et seq. (2001).; Antonio Gambaro, Un argomento a 
due gobbe in tema di trascrizione del trustee in base alla Convenzione dell’Aja, 
I RIV. DIR. CIV. 919 (2002); Francesco Di Ciommo, Ammissibilità del trust 
interno e giustificazione causale dell’effetto traslativo, FORO ITALIANO 1295 
(2004); LUPOI, I TRUST NEL DIRITTO CIVILE, supra note 22. On behalf of the 
positive recognition of the domestic trust, see the study published by the 
Consiglio Nazionale del Notariato, approved on February 10, 2006: Daniele 
Muritano & Luigi F. Risso, Il trust: diritto interno e Convenzione dell’Aja. 
Ruolo e responsabilità del notaio, available at www.notariato.it. Recently, on 
behalf of internal trust, see also Lucilla Gatt, Il trust c.d. interno: una questione 
ancora aperta, 3 NOT. 280 (2011). 
 28. See, for example, supra note 15. 
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not seem due to a rejection of trust ex se, but rather to the abusive 
use of the trust scheme: for example, when a substantial reason for 
segregation of the assets is absent and the recourse to trust and its 
effects is neither supported nor justified by a worthwhile 
purpose.29 
Regardless, trusts undoubtedly are present and operate within 
the Italian arena, thus testifying to their success and appeal in 
fulfilling the parties’ needs in different areas of law:30 in fact, they 
have been utilized within family relationships (both during the 
marriage and in case of separation and divorce), for succession and 
will purposes, and within business context (both in the on-going 
activity phase and in the event of insolvency, in particular with 
reference to bankruptcy—or alternative to bankruptcy—
proceedings31). 
With specific regard to the relationship between trusts and 
bankruptcy issues, a significant contribution has been made by 
Law of 27 January 2012, n. 3—in particular articles 6-14—
providing for cases of over-indebtment not subject to current 
bankruptcy proceedings, and allowing the debtor to enter into a 
debt-reorganization agreement with creditors on the basis of a plan 
 29. See, inter alia, Lorenzo Salvatore, Atto di Destinazione e Crisi di 
Impresa: Strumento a Tutela o contro le Procedure Concorsuali?, 5 RIV. NOT. 
1085 (2012) (further highlighting the need to draw a distinction between: (i) the 
act establishing a trust, which is neutral in itself and therefore cannot be held ex 
se unlawful, and (ii) the specific acts of disposition of the trust assets, which are 
subject to a case by case assessment). 
 30. See, for example, Maurizio Lupoi, Il Contratto di Affidamento 
Fiduciario, 3 RIV. NOT. 513 (2012). See also Elisabetta Corapi, Sul Trust 
Interno Autodichiarato, 6 BANCA, BORSA, TITOLI DI CREDITO 801 (2010) 
(commenting on the judgment of Tribunal of Cagliari, of 4 August 2008 and 
highlighting that the trend of the financial market toward the internationalization 
of law, the increasing value of lex mercatoria, and the phenomenon of forum-
shopping, fostered the recourse to trust within the Italian legal system). 
 31. For an in-depth comparative analysis of trust within the business 
context, see in particular COMMERCIAL TRUSTS IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 
(Michele Graziadei, Ugo Mattei & Lionel Smith eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 
2005). The book is part of the COMMON CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 
series and includes contributions from several countries. The Italian contributors 
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aimed at ensuring the regular payment of creditors not taking part 
in the plan. The plan may provide for collaterals, liquidation of 
certain assets and—for the purposes of the present analysis—the 
fiduciary entrustment (“affidamento fiduciario”) of the debtor’s 
estate to a trustee (“fiduciario”) for purposes of liquidation, 
preservation, and distribution of the proceeds among creditors. In 
particular, it has been noted that the above mentioned agreement, 
which has been referred to in terms of “contratto di affidamento 
fiduciario”, would be the civilian alternative to trusts32: 
accordingly, that would mark a notable development in the 
relationships between trusts and the Italian legal framework, as 
well as other previous legislative attempts to provide for an Italian 
response to issues usually dealt with by means of a trust, although 
the outcome of such previous attempts did not always seem to gain 
the same success. 
III. THE REACTION OF ITALIAN LAWMAKERS: ARTICLE 2645-TER OF 
THE CODICE CIVILE.... 
The reaction of Italian lawmakers to the increasing recourse to 
trusts by private parties, together with the increasing demand for 
new tools able to meet the heterogeneous needs of Italian society 
(for example within family, business, succession context), ended 
up with the introduction in the Italian Civil Code of new provisions 
aimed to operate as alternatives to trusts and, moreover, governed 
by Italian law. 
In particular, in 2005 the Civil Code was amended by the 
insertion of article 2645-ter C.C., which allows the registration in 
public records of acts in public form whereby immovable goods 
and/or registered movable goods are destined, up to ninety years or 
up to the duration of the life of the natural person beneficiary, to 
fulfill protection-deserving interests, referring to people with a 
disability, to public administrations, or to other legal entities or 
 32. Lupoi, Il Contratto di Affidamento Fiduciario, supra note 30. 
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natural persons in compliance with article 1322, paragraph 2 
C.C.33 The registration makes the bond effective toward third 
parties.34 The relevant goods and their fruits can be used only to 
achieve the specifically stated aim, and they can be seized only for 
debts incurred for such aim. 
 This provision has been inserted in the sixth book of the Code, 
generally dealing with protection of rights, and in particular in the 
section providing for registration of acts and their effects toward 
third parties. Pursuant to article 2645-ter C.C., parties are entitled 
to register acts aimed at fulfilling interest worthy of legal 
protection. Namely, it is allowed to create a bond of purpose upon 
certain kind of goods—i.e., registered movables or immovables—
preventing any action by third parties against them. Article 2645-
ter therefore disregards article 2740 C.C. on a debtor’s liability 
because it introduces, as a consequence of an express legislative 
provision, a limit to the general asset-liability of the debtor. 
Although included in a set of provisions dealing with 
registration formalities, this article provides for certain substantial 
aspects, too.  
In particular, it seems to introduce a new category of separate 
assets in addition to the other cases already provided for in the civil 
code: (i) inheritance with benefit of inventory; (ii) bankruptcy 
assets; (iii) the so-called “fondo patrimoniale” as set forth in 
articles 169 and following (a separate asset of goods bound to 
fulfill family’s needs); and (iv) the company’s separate assets for a 
 33. Art. 1322 C.C. provides for parties’ autonomy and its second paragraph 
entitles the creation of atypical contracts to the extent that such contracts pursue 
“protection-deserving interests”. This assessment will be carried out on an ex-
post basis by the judge and, according to the dominant doctrine, it ends up 
verifying whether the atypical contract is lawful or not. See infra note 45. 
 34. Although a notable portion of Italian scholars argues that the 
registration has a constitutive effect, because, absent it, the bond would not exist 
(as well as the constitutive effect of the mortgage’s registration), the majority 
opinion deems that the registration allows enforceability of the bond against 
third parties. According to the latter opinion, therefore, the origin of the bond 
will be the act providing for the bond, its purpose, duration, etc. For an overview 
of this debate see Andrea Ghironi, La Destinazione di Beni ad uno Scopo nel 
Prisma dell’Art. 2645ter c.c., 5 Riv. NOT. 1085 (2011), in particular paragraph 4. 
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specific deal pursuant to article 2447-bis C.C. However, the 
provision was quite incomplete and gave rise to criticism and 
uncertainties, especially among scholars.  
Before dealing with this issue, it seems appropriate to briefly 
address a traditional legal instrument set forth in the Civil Code in 
order to meet the needs of married couples and their children: the 
above-mentioned “fondo patrimoniale”, as provided for by article 
167 and following.35  
Pursuant to the same, the spouses, through a public act, a third 
party, or even by will, are entitled to designate registered 
movables, immovables and/or negotiable instruments to fulfill the 
needs of the family. The fund can even be created during the 
marriage and, absent different provisions, the ownership of the 
involved assets belongs to both spouses. In particular, the natural 
or civil fruits of such assets will be used for the family’s needs. 
The involved goods can neither be sold nor can be subject to 
pledge, encumbrance or any other lien unless agreed to by both 
spouses and, in the event of minor children, without the previous 
authorization of the competent Tribunal. Creditors cannot seize the 
assets and/or their fruits if they knew that the relevant debts were 
incurred for needs different than those of the family.36 
Accordingly, such a legal instrument represents a form of 
segregation of assets explicitly allowed by Italian lawmakers. 
 35. See generally Luca Domenici, Il fondo patrimoniale: negozio di 
protezione dei beni familiari, 5 NOT. 549 et seq. (2011); Andrea Fusaro, 
Commento all’art. 167 c.c., in DELLA FAMIGLIA, I, ARTT. 74 - 176 C.C. at 1048 
(Luigi Balestra ed., Utet 2010), part of the COMMENTARIO DEL CODICE CIVILE 
series (Enrico Gabrielli dir.). 
 36. Art. 170 C.C. deals with the relationship between creditors and the legal 
instrument at stake by providing for three categories of debts: (1) debts incurred 
to fulfill the family’s needs; (2) debts incurred to fulfill interests outside the 
family’s needs, when such circumstance is unknown to the creditor; and (3) 
debts incurred to fulfill interests outside the family’s needs, when such 
circumstance is known to the creditor. Only the first two categories of debts 
entitle the enforcement against the assets of the fund. On the relationship 
between the “fondo patrimoniale” and creditors, see generally ARNALDO 
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Nevertheless, so far it has had limited application.37 Moreover, two 
elements currently seem to further limit its development: on one 
side, the competition of alternative instruments—in particular 
trusts—coupling a broader flexibility and range of application 
together with a more efficient segregation effect and, on the other 
side, the judicial approach aimed to increase the cases in which 
credit enforcement against the assets of the fund is allowed, thanks 
to an extensive construction of the concept of “debts incurred for 
the needs of the family.”38 In addition, as a consequence of the 
black letter of article 167 and following, and of its specific 
insertion in the section aimed to provide for the patrimonial regime 
of spouses, the present legal instrument applies only to married 
couples.39 
A possible Italian response to the limits of this kind of legal 
tool has therefore been identified in article 2645-ter C.C., which, 
because of its wording, can be also used by unmarried couples in 
order to provide for their interests, both between partners and/or on 
behalf of their children.40 
 37. See, for example, Giovanni Gabrielli, Patrimonio familiare e fondo 
patrimoniale, in 32 ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRITTO 293-95 (Giuffrè 1982); 
Tommaso Auletta, Il fondo patrimoniale in IL CODICE CIVILE. COMMENTARIO 15 
et seq. (Piero Schlesinger ed., Giuffrè 1992); Biagio Grasso, Il regime in 
generale e il fondo patrimoniale in 3 TRATTATO DI DIRITTO PRIVATO 420 ( Pietro 
Rescigno ed., Utet 1996). 
 38. The judicial disfavour seems due in part to the fear of a fraudulent use 
of such instrument against the creditors’ legitimate expectations and in part to a 
cultural heritage more favourable to creditor’s rights. In particular, courts 
rendering decisions about “fondo patrimoniale” mostly ruled on the application 
to the same of the paulian action, both ordinary and within bankruptcy 
proceedings. See in particular Francesco Gazzoni, Tentativo dell’impossibile, 
supra note 23; Andrea Ferrari, Fondo patrimoniale e debiti erariali o d’impresa, 
3 FAM. DIR. 303 (2011); Tommaso Auletta, Riflessioni sul fondo patrimoniale, 5 
FAMIGLIA, PERSONE, SUCCESSIONI 326 (2012).  
 39. See, for example, GIACOMO OBERTO, I REGIMI PATRIMONIALI DELLA 
FAMIGLIA DI FATTO (Giuffrè 1991) and Oberto, Famiglia di fatto e convivenze: 
tutela dei soggetti interessati e regolamentazione dei rapporti patrimoniali in 
vista della successione, FAMIGLIA E DIRITTO 661 (2006). 
 40. See generally Barbara Mastropietro, L’Atto di Destinazione tra Codice 
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The broad wording of article 2645ter C.C. and its segregative 
effect can also be applied within the business context, especially 
for bankruptcy proceedings or other default proceedings (for 
example, pre-bankruptcy agreements, business-reorganization 
plans, etc.).41  
However, as mentioned above, the wording of article 2645-ter 
C.C. and its insertion among provisions dealing with registration 
formalities combined to increase criticism and doubts about its 
proper meaning, function and range of application.42 
The doctrinal debate mainly focused on the nature of such an 
article, namely whether it is aimed to provide only for the effects 
of the registration of the bond or whether it implies substantial 
aspects, too, thus providing for some featuring elements of the 
open-ended category of “acts of destination”. Following the second 
interpretation, article 2645-ter C.C. would therefore be the 
legislative recognition of such an open-ended category, in spite of 
its improper insertion and poor formulation. 
Scholars adhering to the first opinion highlight that the 
substantial aspects introduced by the article (form and duration) 
are so limited as to prevent any further legal consequence of the 
article itself, but for the regulation of the public registration’s 
 41. See, for example, Salvatore, Atto di destinazione e crisi di impresa, 
supra note 29. 
 42. See generally Francesco Gazzoni, Osservazioni sull’art. 2645-ter c.c., II 
GIUSTIZIA CIVILE 165 et seq. (2006); Giovanni Gabrielli, Vincoli di destinazione 
importanti separazione patrimoniale e pubblicità nei registri immobiliari, RIV. 
DIR. CIV. 327 (2007); Gaetano Petrelli, La trascrizione degli atti di destinazione, 
RIV. DIR. CIV. 162 (2006), (criticizing the legislative trend of law reforming 
through inconsistent and piecemeal amendments to the civil code); Giuseppe 
Tucci, Fiducie, trust e atti di destinazione ex art. 2645-ter c.c. in 2 STUDI IN 
ONORE DI NICOLÒ LIPARI 2919, 2960 (Vincenzo Cuffaro & Giovanni di Rosa 
coords., Giffrè 2008) (stressing the obscurity of the legislative provision); 
Renato Clarizia, L’art. 2645 ter e gli interessi meritevoli di tutela in 1 STUDI IN 
ONORE DI GIORGIO CIAN 545 (Giovanni De Cristofaro & Stefano Delle Monache 
eds., CEDAM 2010); Arturo Picciotto, Brevi note sull’art. 2645 ter: il trust e 
l’araba fenice, CONTRATTO E IMPRESA 1317 (2006) (highlighting the low quality 
of the legislative intervention). 
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effects; and the insertion of the same among provisions dealing 
with registration formalities would confirm such interpretation.43 
On the contrary, scholars following the second approach44 
argue that: (i) the specific mention of substantial aspects (like 
form, duration, kind of goods involved, beneficiares and parties 
entitled to act on behalf and for the purposes of the bond), and (ii) 
the express reference to article 1322, paragraph 2 C.C. would 
therefore demonstrate legislative recognition of the open-ended 
category of acts of destination, entitling parties to fill the gap of 
such scarce legal framework with autonomous provisions to the 
extent that the relevant juridical act (even when unilateral) fulfills 
the judicial test set forth in article 1322, paragraph 2.45  
 43. See, for example, Paola Manes, La norma sulla trascrizione di atti di 
destinazione è, dunque, norma sugli effetti, CONTRATTO E IMPRESA 626, 630 et 
seq. (2006) (highlighting that the new article has been inserted among those 
providing for registration formalities and their effects toward third parties). See 
also Raffaele Lenzi, Le destinazioni atipiche e l’art. 2645 ter c.c., CONTRATTO E 
IMPRESA 229 et seq. (2007); Picciotto, Brevi note sull’art. 2645 ter, supra note 
42, at 1318. Among the case law see, for example, Tribunal of Reggio Emilia, of 
22 June 2012; Tribunal of Trieste, of 7 April 2006, RIV. NOT. 367 (2007). 
 44. See, for example, Lucilla Gatt, Il trust c.d. interno: una questione 
ancora aperta, 3 NOT. 280, 291 et seq. (2011) (highlighting, in contrast with the 
aforementioned opinion—see supra note 43 and the corresponding text—the 
proper choice of the lawmaker in setting forth the minimum legal requirements 
of the provision at stake and enhancing the role of each party’s autonomy in 
tailoring such an instrument to the respective interests and expectations); 
Gazzoni, Osservazioni sull’art. 2645-ter c.c., supra note 42, at 165; Mario 
Nuzzo, Atto di destinazione e interessi meritevoli di tutela in LA TRASCRIZIONE 
DELL’ATTO NEGOZIALE DI DESTINAZIONE. L’ART. 2645 TER DEL CODICE CIVILE 
60 ( Bianca Mirzia ed., Giuffrè 2007); BIANCA MIRZIA, MAURIZIO D’ERRICO, 
ALESSANDRO DE DONATO & CONCETTA PRIORE, L’ATTO NOTARILE DI 
DESTINAZIONE. L’ART. 2645-TER DEL CODICE CIVILE (Giuffrè 2006); Bianca 
Mirzia, Il nuovo art. 2645 ter c.c. Notazioni a margine di un provvedimento del 
giudice tavolare di Trieste, II GIUSTIZIA CIVILE 189 (2006); Bianca Mirzia, 
L’atto di destinazione: problemi applicativi, RIV. NOT. 1176 (2006); Arnaldo 
Morace Pinelli, Tipicità dell’atto di destinazione e alcuni aspetti della sua 
disciplina, RIV. DIR. CIV. 451, 468 (2008); Giacomo Rojas Elgueta, Il rapporto 
tra l’art. 2645-ter c.c. e l’art. 2740 c.c.: un’analisi economica della nuova 
disciplina, BANCA, BORSA, TITOLI DI CREDITO 203 (2007); Giorgio Rispoli, 
Riflessioni in tema di meritevolezza degli atti di destinazione, 8-9 CORRIERE DI 
MERITO 806, 808 (2011); Mastropietro, supra note 40. 
 45. Initially, the test under art. 1322, para. 2 C.C. used to be interpreted in 
light of a super-eminent and overriding principle of public interest (see in 
particular EMILIO BETTI, TEORIA GENERALE DEL NEGOZIO GIURIDICO 191 et seq. 
(reprint, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane 1994); subsequently this approach 
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A second main issue dealt with the proper meaning of 
“interests worthy of protection” as provided for by the article 
2645-ter C.C. with regard to the purpose of the relevant bond. 
According to a minority opinion, such a requirement and the 
reference to article 1322, paragraph 2 C.C. overlap, both requiring 
that the act and the relevant bond be lawful.46 The wording of 
article 2345-ter C.C. would consequently be redundant because of 
the double reference to the lawfulness requirement. This approach 
has been criticized by those who deem that the reference to 
“interests worthy of protection” cannot be intended as a mere 
duplication of the lawfulness test under article 1322, paragraph 2 
C.C.47 However, scholars disagree about the proper meaning of 
this requirement. 
According to a different opinion, the requirement implies a 
selection of interests: the bond under article 2345-ter C.C. may 
therefore operate only if aimed at pursuing high-value interests, for 
example, those encompassed in the Constitution (especially in its 
first part). Such interpretation lies on (and it is aimed to highlight) 
the value of the specific reference in the black letter of the article 
to people with a disability or public entities.48 Adherents to the 
changed, and currently such provisions are interpreted as requiring the the 
contract be lawful. See in particular Giovanni B. Ferri, Meritevolezza 
dell’interesse e utilità sociale, II RIV. DIR. COMM. 81 (1971); Ferri, Ancora in 
tema di meritevolezza dell’interesse, I RIV. DIR. COMM. 1 (1979); Attilo 
Guarneri, Meritevolezza dell’interesse e utilità sociale del contratto, I RIV. DIR. 
CIV. 799 (1994); Vincenzo Roppo, Il contratto in 5 TRATTATO DI DIRITTO 
PRIVATO 402-03 (Giovanni Iudica & Paolo Zatti eds., Giuffrè 2001). 
 46. Gianfranco Palermo, Configurazione dello scopo, opponibilità del 
vincolo, realizzazione dell’assetto di interessi in LA TRASCRIZIONE DELL’ATTO 
NEGOZIALE DI DESTINAZIONE, supra note 44, at 77; Giuseppe Vettori, Atto di 
destinazione e trascrizione. L’art. 2645ter, LA TRASCRIZIONE DELL’ATTO 
NEGOZIALE DI DESTINAZIONE, supra note 44, at 176; Aurelio Gentili, 
Destinazioni patrimoniali, trust e tutela del disponente in LE NUOVE FORME DI 
ORGANIZZAZIONE DEL PATRIMONIO (Giovanni Doria ed., Giappichelli 2010); 
RISPOLI, Riflessioni, supra note 44, at 810 (arguing in favor of a full overlapping 
of the two tests). 
 47. See infra note 50 and the corresponding text. 
 48. Such an interpretation has been criticized by scholars adhering to the 
previous opinion insofar as it would require public notaries and officials of the 
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present approach, indeed, stress that such a reference has been 
generally neglected as the by-product of a previous draft of the 
article, later modified at the moment of its enactment, but not 
properly amended;49 on the contrary, in their opinion, since this 
reference has been maintained in the currently-in-force version of 
the article, the same cannot be neglected or disregarded. 
Consequently, article 2645-ter C.C. may work as long as the 
relevant bond is intended to pursue a peculiar kind of interest, 
implying high-quality values of social solidarity.50 
Finally, according to the majority opinion:51 (i) the article at 
stake has recognized the category of “destination acts”, thus 
enhancing the role of each party’s autonomy in providing the 
content of such an atypical category;52 (ii) reference to article 
1322, paragraph 2 C.C. shall therefore be intended as the 
requirement to be met for the specific destination act to be legally 
enforceable; (iii) the mention of “interests worthy of protection” 
shall not be intended as a mere duplicate of the test set forth by 
article 1322, paragraph 2 C.C., but rather has to be interpreted as 
requiring that the bond is created to fulfill a qualified interest to be 
assessed quam in concreto; and (iv) finally, reference to people 
Register of immovables to assess whether the juridical act imposing the bond is 
aimed at pursuing worthwhile interests or not. For bibliographic references, see 
supra note 46. 
 49. This aspect has been specifically highlighted by Rispoli, Riflessioni, 
supra note 44, at 810. 
 50. See, for example, Gazzoni, Osservazioni sull’art. 2645-ter, supra note 
42, at 165; Paolo Spada, Conclusioni to LA TRASCRIZIONE DELL’ATTO 
NEGOZIALE DI DESTINAZIONE, supra note 44, at 201, 203. 
 51. See generally Nuzzo, Atto di destinazione e interessi meritevoli di 
tutela, supra note 44, at 68; Rolando Quadri, L’art. 2645-ter e la nuova 
disciplina degli atti di destinazione, CONTRATTO E IMPRESA 1729 (2006); 
Petrelli, La trascrizione degli atti di destinazione, supra note 42, at 179. 
 52. See also Antonio Gambaro, Appunti sulla Proprietà nell’Interesse 
Altrui, 2 TRUSTS 169 (2007) (arguing that art. 2645-ter C.C. has officially 
marked the legislative recognition of “property on behalf of another party.” 
Accordingly, such a mechanism implies a distinction between the ownership in 
itself and the economic interest pertaining to a different party, so that the owner 
will have to exercise her right in order to pursue such interest and the relevant 
bond will be effective toward third parties. 
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with disabilities and/or public entities has an exemplificative but 
non-exhaustive role, since the wording of the article explicitly 
mentions, in addition to the those former, interests related to 
private parties as well. Consequently, the requirement of a 
qualified interest does not imply a selection among relevant and 
non-relevant public interests, but rather the need to verify the 
presence of a specific (and lawful) interest. Specifically, reference 
to the qualified interest is aimed at excluding cases in which the 
interest is lacking or is unlawful and, at the same time, to stress 
that the bond (and the consequent segregation effect) is not a value 
ex se.53 Accordingly, courts should disregard bonds created merely 
to prevent enforcement of the creditor’s rights, as well as those 
lacking interest or pursuing an unlawful result. Following such an 
approach, it has been argued that a bond in which the settlor is at 
the same time the beneficiary should not be recognized while a 
doubt still persists when the settlor is included among other 
beneficiaries (for example, when the bond created by the husband 
is aimed to fulfill the interests of the family members).54 
Anyway, it has been highlighted that article 2645-ter C.C. 
might imply a new interpretation of the “fiducia cum amico” 
scheme: traditionally, in civil law systems, the fiduciary bond may 
be invoked only inter partes and cannot be enforced against third 
parties, leaving the former owner of the goods with the sole 
remedy to make a claim for compensation of damages in the event 
of breach of the fiduciary agreement by the counter-party. On the 
contrary, should the fiduciary agreement (and therefore the 
fiduciary bond over the relevant goods) be registered pursuant to 
article 2645-ter C.C., the fiduciary obligation and the consequent 
bond would be effective toward third parties.55 
 53. Id., passim. 
 54. Id., passim.  
 55. See, for example, GIOVANNI IUDICA & PAOLO ZATTI, LINGUAGGIO E 
REGOLE DEL DIRITTO PRIVATO 345 (14th ed., CEDAM 2013); PAOLO ZATTI & 
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On the other side, scholars who had adopted a critical approach 
to the recognition of trusts in Italy believe that article 2645-ter is 
the means by which to recognize and register trusts in Italy (even 
domestic ones) over registered movables and immovables since, in 
this case, the previous legislative gap has been filled.56 However, it 
has to be noted that there was no need of such an article to 
recognize and register trusts in Italy because these effects are a 
direct consequence of the Convention, as mentioned above. 
Indeed, trusts were recognized and registered before the 
introduction of article 2645-ter C.C. In addition, it would be 
difficult to argue as to why internal trusts may be recognized 
insofar as they can be registered pursuant to article 2645-ter C.C. 
(and therefore to the extent that they include only registered 
movables or immovables), while internal trusts involving only 
movables goods (and therefore not subject to registration) may not. 
Such an assumption would create an unequal treatment difficult to 
be reconciled. Furthermore, trusts and article 2645-ter C.C. do not 
overlap, except in partial aspects, and therefore they remain 
different.57 Accordingly, it would be improper to qualify article 
2645-ter C.C. in terms of the legal framework granted by Italian 
lawmakers to internal trusts. 
Namely, trusts show a broader range of application in terms of 
interests to be fulfilled; furthermore, they imply the presence of a 
trustee with all the powers and duties related to such a capacity, as 
well as all the features of the governing law, including the relevant 
remedies, too.  
 56. For an overview of such an approach, see generally Valentina Bellomia, 
La Tutela dei Bisogni della Famiglia tra Fondo Patrimoniale e Atto di 
Destinazione, 2 DIR. FAM. 698 (2013). 
 57. For a comparison between trust and art. 2645-ter C.C., see, for example, 
AMELIA C. DILANDRO, TRUSTS E SEPARAZIONE PATRIMONIALE NEI RAPPORTI 
FAMILIARI E PERSONALI (Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane 2010) (highlighting the 
broader range of the application of trusts). See also Maurizio Lupoi, Gli “Atti di 
Destinazione” nel Nuovo Art. 2645-ter Cod. Civ. Quale Frammento di Trust, 
TRUSTS 169 (2006). 
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On the contrary, it may be true that article 2645-ter, since 
subject to Italian law, might appear more familiar to Italian parties 
and might raise less operative difficulties than having to deal with 
a foreign law, as in the case of trusts. However, this is not an 
argument which seems to have played a significant role within the 
Italian scenario since private parties, professional advisors and 
Italian judges did not give the impression of being discouraged by 
such alleged inconvenience, as testified to by the broad recourse to 
trusts and by their broad judicial recognition.58 
However, article 2645-ter C.C., in spite of its incomplete 
formulation, seems to be a further opportunity offered to Italian 
parties when assessing which legal tool would better meet their 
needs: an additional item in the Italian menu (although the relevant 
recipe has not yet been definitively developed).59 
IV. ....AND THE “PATTO DI FAMIGLIA” 
The Italian menu has been also enriched with the introduction 
of article 768-bis–768-octies C.C., providing for the “Patto di 
famiglia”.60  
“Patto di famiglia” (hereinafter “family agreement”) is a 
contract whereby the entrepreneur carrying on a business activity, 
 58. In this regard, an important role is played by the business community 
together with private institutions like, for example, “Il Trust in Italia” 
(http://www.il-trust-in-italia.it), President Professor Maurizio Lupoi, promoting 
education on trusts through conferences, seminars and a specific post-graduate 
program, and hosting a worldwide web database on trusts. In addition, among 
the Italian law reviews, two deal specifically with trusts: TRUSTS AND ATTIVITÀ 
FIDUCIARIE and TRUSTS. 
 59. See Gambaro, Appunti, supra note 52 (noting that the law of trusts is the 
result of centuries of experience grounded on the property on behalf of another 
person. Similarly, with the introduction of art. 2645-ter C.C. being a recent 
event, the process of developing a proper set of rules and knowledge to deal 
with such new concept within the Italian legal system is only at the beginning).  
 60. The above-mentioned provisions have been introduced by art. 2 of Law 
14 February 2006, n. 55. The insertion of the family agreement as a tool to 
provide for the family buy-out has been the Italian response to the guidelines of 
the European Institutions requiring State members to deal with such issue: see 
the Recommendation of the EU Commission 94/1069/EC of 7 February 1994, 
1994 O. J. (L385), together with Communication of the EU Commissions of 28 
March 1998, 1998 J.O. (C093) 2. 
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on his own or by means of a company, grants the business assets or 
the shares to the person who, among his descendants, appears more 
able to continue the family business. The grant may be in favor of 
more descendants, too. Pursuant to the contract, the grantee is 
bound to pay to the grantor’ spouse and to the other descendants a 
sum equivalent to what they would be entitled to receive as forced 
heirs under article 536 C.C., should the grantor’s succession occur 
at the date of the agreement. The sum received as the equivalent of 
the business assets or of the company’s quotas would count as part 
of the overall quota of forced inheritance respectively owed to the 
spouse and to each descendant.61 
Similarly, the goods received by the grantee under the family 
agreement will count as quota of the forced inheritance owed to the 
same. Should the value of the grant be higher than the amount to 
be paid as respective forced heirship, the exceeding part will be 
qualified as part of the disposable portion of the grantor’s estate, 
and the grantee will be the beneficiary of this exceeding part.62 The 
grant and the payment made as consequence of the family 
agreement will not be subject to collation or reduction.63 
The aim of the family agreement is therefore the anticipation, 
by means of an inter vivos act, of the succession effects as defined 
and crystallized at the date of the agreement. This implies the risk 
of a possible sacrifice to the credit-rights of the other descendants 
should the value of the business assets or of the quotas assigned to 
the grantee be accrued at the death of the grantor, rather than at the 
date of the agreement. Vice versa, such anticipatory effect will 
 61. Art. 768-quater C.C. The Italian civil code refers to this concept in term 
of “quota di legittima”; the Louisiana civil refers to “legitimate portion” or 
“legitime”: see, for example, art. 1234 (Reduction of donations exceeding 
disposable portions; calculation of legitime) or Title II (Of donations inter vivos 
and mortis causa) – Chapter 1 (Louisiana Trust Code) – Subpart I (Arts. 1841-
1847) dealing with “The Legitime in Trust”. Please note that the legislative 
decree 154/2013 has repealed any residual distinction between natural children 
and legitimate children. 
 62. See, for example, IL PATTO DI FAMIGLIA (Ubaldo La Porta ed., Utet 
2007).  
 63. Art. 768-ter C.C. 
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imply a sacrifice of the grantee’s rights in the event the value of 
such goods at the death of the grantor is lower than the amount the 
grantee paid to the other descendants under the family 
agreement.64 
The purpose of the agreement is therefore to fulfill the family 
buy-out. Such aim is perceived as very important within Italian 
society since the majority of Italian enterprises are small-medium 
ones, family-run, and therefore generally managed by the founder, 
together with members of his family.65 Accordingly, the intuitu 
personae element and the proper management of the family buy-
out through the identification of the descendant most capable of 
carrying on the family-business has always been one of the major 
concerns of Italian entrepreneurs, as well as the need to preserve 
the business value from any potential conflict among the family 
members. However, such an expectation mostly clashed with the 
right of each descendant to receive a quota of the non-disposable 
portion of the succession estate in those cases in which the relevant 
estate includes the ownership of a family-business and/or the 
family-run company. In order to balance these opposing interests, 
Italian lawmakers tried to reach a compromise through the family 
agreement mechanism. Accordingly, the elected descendant will be 
granted the family business, thus ensuring the positive outcome of 
the family buy-out, but, at the same time, he will have to pay-off 
the right of credits of the forced heirs,66 thus ensuring compliance 
with the mandatory provisions of Italian law on legitime. The 
introduction of the family agreement induced several comments 
about its nature and legal effects. In particular, it has been pointed 
out that such legal instrument would be a multilateral contract, 
 64. IL PATTO DI FAMIGLIA, supra note 62, passim. 
 65. See generally Paolo Manes, Prime Considerazioni sul Patto di Famiglia 
nella Gestione del Passaggio Generazionale della Ricchezza Familiare, 2 
CONTRATTO E IMPRESA 539 (2006). 
 66. Such an obligation of payment has therefore been intended as counter-
performance of the grant: see in particular Francesco Gazzoni, Appunti e spunti 
in tema di patto di famiglia, II GIUSTIZIA CIVILE 219, 221 (2006). 
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although it would not amount to a partnership or to an association 
agreement.67 Accordingly, lack of adhesion by any of the 
descendant renders the agreement null.68 In the opinion of some 
authors, in a such case the agreement would be valid, but not 
effective towards the non-adhering party, who will therefore be 
entitled to claim for collation,69 while other authors deem the 
agreement as falling within the category of contracts in favour of 
third parties.70 
With reference to this kind of legal instrument, the debate 
within the Italian arena mainly focused on its nature, the role of 
non-adhering descendants and the consequences of such non-
adhesion, and on possible remedies and the proper relationship 
with mandatory succession provisions. The common opinion 
within the Italian sphere is that such a legal instrument 
encompasses interesting potentialities, but nevertheless needs to be 
improved—especially in its formulation.71  
 67. Id. 
 68. IL PATTO DI FAMIGLIA. NEGOZIABILITA DEL DIRITTO SUCCESSORIO CON 
LA LEGGE 14 FEBBRAIO 2006, N. 55 at 244 (Bruno Inzitari ed., G. Giappichelli 
2006); Federico Tassinari, Il patto di Famiglia: Presupposti Soggettivi, 
Oggettivi e Requisiti Formali in PATTI DI FAMIGLIA PER L’IMPRESA 150, 159 
(Fondazione italiana per il notariato coord., Il Sole 24 Ore 2006); Andrea 
Zoppini, L’Emersione della Categoria della Successione Anticipata (Note sul 
Patto di Famiglia) in PATTI DI FAMIGLIA PER L’IMPRESA 277 (Fondazione 
italiana per il notariato coord., Il Sole 24 Ore 2006); Giuseppe Amadio, Patto di 
Famiglia e Funzione Divisionale, RIV. NOT. 867, 884 (2006); Nicola Di Mauro, 
I Necessari Partecipanti al Patto di Famiglia, FAMIGLIA PERSONE SOCIETA 534 
(2006); G. BONILINI, MANUALE DI DIRITTO EREDITARIO E DELLE DONAZIONI 168 
(4th ed., Utet 2006); Luigi Balestra, Prime Osservazioni sul Patto di Famiglia, 
II NUOVA GIUR. CIV. COMM. 376 (2006). 
 69. See in particular Giorgio Oppo, Patto di Famiglia e Diritti della 
Famiglia, 4 RIV. DIR. CIV. 441 (2006). 
 70. See, for example, Dario Restuccia, Patto di famiglia e strumenti 
tradizionali di trasmissione della ricchezza in PATTO DI FAMIGLIA 94 et seq., 
supra note 62. 
 71. A first legislative attempt was made during the draft of decree n. 
70/2011 (the “development decree”, providing for incentives for the small-
medium enterprises), then converted in Law 106 of 12 July 2011: a preliminary 
version of such text included provisions aimed to significantly amend the whole 
scheme of the “patto di famiglia”, both from the legal and tax perspective. 
However, in the enacted version of the above-mentioned decree, any reference 
to such reform has been erased. While some commentators deem it a “lost 
opportunity”, others believe that it grants more time for appropriate reflection 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
Italian legal framework reveals a complex and heterogeneous 
set of different legal tools aimed at meeting the different needs of 
Italian society. In particular, rather than a list of dishes, the Italian 
menu seems to offer a list of ingredients—some traditional, other 
of recent creation or mostly unknown since not long ago, some 
autochthonous (although clearly inspired by other experiences), 
other imported—which can be combined by customers in light of 
their taste and preferences. However, the process is still developing 
and seems to demand greater confidence and some improvements. 
Nevertheless, a notable element of such a caldron is the on-going 
dialogue among the different formants, which is progressively 
changing the Italian scene. Accordingly, at the end of 2013 the 
words used by a scholar in 2004 to describe the reactions induced 
by trust within the Italian legal system appear still up-to-date:  
It is impossible not to listen to Italian academics and 
practitioners discussing everything from the structuring of a 
trust to trustee liability and the beneficiary’s remedies 
without reflecting that this was how things must have been 
in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries in 
England. The difference, of course, is the twist given to 
Italian discussions by the fact that they are taking place 
against the backdrop of the modern sophisticated common 
law trust reaching into every corner of segregated private 
and public investment, asset securitisation, creditor 
security, and asset holding and management. The whole 
Italian trust scene is fascinating, and for the practitioners 
and academic involved evidently exciting.72  
At that time, the author expressed disappointment for not 
having the opportunity to turn the page and see what was going to 
over the issue. See, for example, Roberto Siclari, La Riforma Mancata del Patto 
di Famiglia: Occasione Persa o Viatico per una più Attenta Riflessione?, 1 RIV. 
NOT. 17 (2012). 
 72. Donovan Waters, The Hague Trust Convention Twenty Years On in 
COMMERCIAL TRUSTS IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, supra note 31, at 56, 92. 
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happen in the “Mediterranean saga”.73 In this sense, the 
Mediterranean saga goes on. 
 73. Id. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
